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CASE SUMMARY
WELLS FARGO V. CITY OF OAKLAND:
A MATTER OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
SHAWNA DOUGHMAN*
INTRODUCTION
President Lyndon B. Johnson1 saw passage of the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”)2 to be a fitting tribute to the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., who had just been assassinated. The United States was in turmoil,
much as it is today, with cities burning and people divided.3 The FHA
was first introduced by Democratic senator Walter Mondale.4 The lobby-
ing efforts of Republican senator Edward Brooke, the first Black senator
to be elected by popular vote, and Democratic senator Edward Kennedy
finally brought this legislation to fruition5 as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.6  Senator Mondale remarked, “in truly integrated
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Golden Gate University School of Law; M.A., Psychology, Santa
Clara University; B.A., Psychology, Brigham Young University; Associate Editor, Golden Gate
University Law Review.
1 “President Lyndon B. Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
orders (commonly known as the ‘Kerner Commission’). The Kerner Commission found that several
government-sanctioned practices disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities’ fair access to housing,
including rapid urbanization, the flight of white families to suburban neighborhoods, racially restric-
tive covenants, real estate agents who steered homebuyers into racially homogenous areas, and dis-
criminatory lending practices like redlining and reverse redlining.” City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo
& Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020).
2 The FHA makes it unlawful to discriminate against people in any housing practices because
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.
3 History of Fair Housing, HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_
equal_opp/aboutfheo/ history (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
4 Eric W.M. Bain, Race, Disparate Impact and the Federal Housing Administration, RACE,
RACISM AND THE LAW, https://www.racism.org/articles/basic-needs/propertyland/301-housing/1442-
another-missed-opportunity?start=1, (last visited Oct. 21, 2020).
5 Id.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et. seq.
11
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neighborhoods, people have been able to live in peace and harmony—
and both [Blacks] and whites7 are richer for the experience.”8
Although the FHA has been “rightfully lauded as one of the greatest
achievements of the civil rights movement,”9 discriminatory lending
practices have continued.10 These lending practices, called redlining11
and reverse redlining (also known as predatory lending),12 have not
ceased to devastate individuals, families, neighborhoods and cities.13 In
2018, the City of Oakland, California (“Oakland”), sued Wells Fargo to
address part of what the FHA set out to do: end discrimination in lend-
ing.14 The court quoted senator Mondale, the chief sponsor of the FHA,
who cited cities’ declining tax bases as a specific injury traced to dis-
crimination in housing.15 Wells Fargo appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bank of America Corpora-
tion v. City of Miami (“Miami I”),16 the court held that Oakland must be
given a chance to prove that its harm was within the zone of interest
affected by Wells Fargo’s actions.
7 John Daniszewski, Why we will lowercase white, AP THE DEFINITIVE SOURCE (July 20,
2020), https://blog.ap.org/announcements/why-we-will-lowercase-white?utm_campaign=Social
Flow&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=AP_CorpComm.
8 114 CONG. REC. 3421, 3422 (Feb. 20, 1968).
9 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020).
10 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100915, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).
11 “Redlining is the practice of denying home loans to residents of minority neighborhoods.”
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2020). As part of the govern-
ment-sponsored Home Owners’ Loan Corporation in the 1930s, the government developed color-
coded maps with minority neighborhoods marked in red to show those that were the riskiest areas to
insure mortgages. Abdallah Fayyad, The Unfulfilled Promise of Fair Housing, THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/the-unfulfilled-promise-of-fair-
housing/557009. Between 1934 and 1962, virtually all loans for housing through this federal pro-
gram went to white homeowners, resulting in the segregation of today. Abdallah Fayyad, The Unful-
filled Promise of Fair Housing, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2018/03/the-unfulfilled-promise-of-fair-housing/557009.
12 “Reverse redlining. . .is the practice of issuing home loans to minority borrowers with
significantly higher costs and more onerous terms than those offered to similarly situated White
borrowers—also known as ‘predatory loans.’ Predatory loans include, for example, subprime loans,
negative amortization loans, ‘No-Doc’ loans that require no supporting evidence of a borrower’s
income, loans with balloon payments, and ‘interest only’ loans that carry a prepayment penalty.”
City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2020).
13 Abdallah Fayyad, supra note 11, at 12.
14 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS100915, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).
15 Id. at *16 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (Feb. 6, 1968)).
16 Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami (“Miami I”), 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Oakland alleged that Wells Fargo engaged in predatory lending and
discriminatory lending practices with Oakland residents, resulting in high
rates of foreclosures and harm to Oakland.17 Oakland claimed that this
practice constituted both intentional and disparate-impact discrimina-
tion.18 Based on what Oakland alleged were Wells Fargo’s discrimina-
tory behaviors, Oakland claimed three kinds of injuries: (1) decreased
property taxes, (2) increased municipal expenditures to maintain fore-
closed properties, and (3) neutralized spending Oakland had earmarked
for other needs to support fair housing.19
Wells Fargo moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.20 The main thrust of Wells Fargo’s motion
was that Oakland could not establish proximate cause.21 This decision by
the Ninth Circuit is pursuant to Miami I.22 In Miami I, the Supreme
Court considered a similar case in which the city of Miami sued Wells
Fargo and Bank of America, alleging that they “intentionally issued risk-
ier mortgages on less favorable terms to African-American and Latino
customers than they issued to similarly situated white, non-Latino cus-
tomers.”23 The Court considered, under the FHA, whether Miami had
prudential standing (different from constitutional standing)24 to bring
suit, and whether Bank of America’s and Wells Fargo’s actions proxi-
mately caused Miami’s injuries.25
17 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100915, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).
18 Id. at *3.
19 Id.
20 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion requests dismissal of a case, claiming that even if all the allega-
tions are true, there is still not a claim that can lead to relief.  To survive a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the complaint must include facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
21 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100915, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).
22 Id. at *3 (citing Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017)).
23 Miami I, 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
24 “To satisfy the Constitution’s restriction of this Court’s jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and ‘Contro-
versies,’ Art. III, § 2, a plaintiff must demonstrate constitutional standing. To do so, the plaintiff
must show an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s conduct and ‘that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct.
1296, 1302 (2017) (quoting Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)).
25 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100915, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).  The question of prudential standing concerns “the
question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone
3
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One question that prudential standing asks is whether the person or
entity bringing the suit falls within the zone of interests meant to be pro-
tected by a statute, here the FHA, thus creating an “aggrieved person” the
statute is meant to protect.26 Proximate cause is a concept that asks
whether an injury is sufficiently close in time and space to a given action,
such that it is legally appropriate to attribute the injury to that action.27
The Miami I Court relied on the analysis in Lexmark International, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., where it held “[p]roximate-cause
analysis is controlled by the nature of the statutory cause of action. The
question it presents is whether the harm alleged has a sufficiently close
connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”28
Oakland claimed Wells Fargo discriminated against Oakland re-
sidents through facially neutral practices. Though facially neutral, these
practices resulted in unequal access to loans, loan terms, and information
in minority communities, carried out by employees with too little gui-
dance and too many improper incentives to sell to minority borrowers.29
Oakland alleged that Wells Fargo’s practices resulted in more expensive,
less straightforward loans for Black and Latino borrowers, referred to as
high cost/high risk loans (HCHR).30
Oakland relied on regression analyses,31 mathematical techniques it
used to isolate the effects of predatory lending on Oakland neighbor-
hoods.32 The analyses showed Black borrowers were 2.583 times more
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Ass’n.
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
26 The FHA provides that an “aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropri-
ate United States district court or State court. . .to obtain appropriate relief with respect to [a] dis-
criminatory housing practice[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). An aggrieved person is further defined
as any person who “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3602(i). “We hold that the City’s claimed injuries fall within the zone of interests the FHA argua-
bly protects. Hence, the City is an ‘aggrieved person’ able to bring suit under the statute.” Miami I,
137 S. Ct. at 1301.
27 Proximate cause is “[a] cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability.” Proximate
Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Proximate cause typically requires an injury to
be a reasonably foreseeable result of a given action. See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162
N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
28 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014) (hold-
ing that a replacement part maker had standing to sue a printer and cartridge company who misled
customers. Prudential standing was granted as the maker was found to be within the zone of interests
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125).
29 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100915, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).
30 Id. at *6.
31 Regression analysis is “the use of mathematical and statistical techniques to estimate one
variable from another. . .” Regression Analysis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/regression%20analysis#:~:text=save%20Word-,Definition%20of%20regression
%20analysis,regression%20lines%20to%20empirical%20data (last visited October 8, 2020).
32 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1120.
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likely than white borrowers to receive a HCHR loan.33 Latino borrowers
were 3.312 times more likely to receive a HCHR than a white bor-
rower.34 The regression analyses relied on by Oakland controlled for
such independent factors as credit score but did not take into account
other variables such as job loss, medical hardship, or divorce, cited as
critical “life events” by Wells Fargo.35
As a defense, Wells Fargo argued that these life events are to blame
for increased foreclosures.36 However, the court countered that by mak-
ing this argument Wells Fargo was implying “that minority borrowers
are somehow more likely than white borrowers to get divorced, suffer
from medical hardships, or lose their jobs.”37 HCHR loans are more ex-
pensive and riskier than typical loans, which makes them more likely to
result in a default on the loan and a foreclosed property.38 The court did
not agree with Well Fargo’s claim that the life events caused the default,
but rather held that the higher incidence of HCHR loans in minority
neighborhoods caused more foreclosures.39
Oakland claimed Wells Fargo injured the city in three ways. First,
the foreclosed properties, as well as related short sales and vacancies, led
to lower property values, which in turn led to lower property-tax revenue
for the city.40 Second, the city claimed a corresponding increase in “va-
grancy, criminal activity, fire hazards, and threats to public health and
safety.”41 These dangers caused the city unnecessary expenditures and
exacerbated already lowering property values, again affecting tax reve-
nues.42 Finally, Wells Fargo’s practices disproportionately affected city
minorities, which “impair[ed] the City’s goals of racial integration and
non-discrimination in housing, and adversely impact[ed] the City’s nu-
merous programs in pursuit of those goals, neutralizing spending on
those programs.”43 However, as to the third claim, Oakland did not rely
on regression analyses or other statistical tools for support.44
33 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100915, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).
34 Id. at *6.
35 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1134
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-04321-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100915, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018).
39 Id.
40 Id. at *7.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1121.
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B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Oakland sued Wells Fargo in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California.45 In addition to monetary damages, Oak-
land further sought to enjoin Wells Fargo from the predatory practices it
allegedly employed against Black and Latino borrowers.46
While the case was pending, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Miami I.47 Because of the overt similarity between the two cases, the
district court stayed the proceedings to wait for a ruling from the Su-
preme Court.48 In Miami I, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must
establish proximate cause by more compelling reasons than that the
aforementioned injuries “foreseeably flowed from the alleged statutory
violation.”49 The lower court in Miami I determined that the city proved
its financial injuries were a foreseeable result of the banks’ practices, but
the Supreme Court held that foreseeability alone was not sufficient to
prove proximate cause.50 The Court held that, although “[t]he housing
market is interconnected with economic and social life,” Congress did
not intend to provide a remedy for “any foreseeable result of an FHA
violation.”51 The Court left for “lower courts [to] define. . .the contours
of proximate cause under the FHA.”52 Additionally, the lower courts
would need to “decide how that standard applies to the City’s claims for
lost property-tax revenue and increased municipal expenses.”53
The district court instructed Oakland to amend its complaint consis-
tent with the decision in Miami I.54 The Northern District of California
denied Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss regarding Oakland’s claim for
decreased property taxes.55 The court also allowed claims for the second
injury (increased municipal expenditures to maintain foreclosed proper-
ties), but only for injunctive and declaratory relief, declining without
prejudice Oakland’s attempt to seek damages.56 Lastly, the court dis-
missed without prejudice Oakland’s claim regarding neutralized spend-
ing for other needs to support fair housing. The court viewed the claim as
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
48 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1121.





54 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1121.
55 Id. at 1117.
56 Id.
6
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threadbare, without “precisely ascertain[ing]” how and to what extent
Wells Fargo’s conduct impacted Oakland’s municipal expense output.57
Wells Fargo appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit.58 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part the findings of the district
court.59 The court affirmed the district court’s “denial of Wells Fargo’s
motion to dismiss as to Oakland’s claims for lost property-tax revenues
and the district court’s grant of Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss as to
Oakland’s claims for increased municipal expenses.”60 However, the
court reversed the “district court’s denial of Wells Fargo’s motion to dis-
miss as to Oakland’s claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief”
and remanded the claim.61
II. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court identified two prongs for analysis by lower
courts: (1) the definition of the “contours of proximate cause under the
FHA,” and (2) the decision of “how that standard applies to the City’s
claim for lost property-tax revenues and increased municipal
expenses.”62
A. THE CONTOURS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE UNDER THE FHA
Proximate cause analysis requires “some direct relation between the
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”63 To prove proximate
cause, the Court suggests looking to “the first step” between injury and
conduct.64 This process requires an analysis of two sub-components: (1)
an assessment of the “nature of the statutory cause of action,”65 and (2)
determining “what is administratively possible and convenient.”66
57 Id. at 1136.
58 City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2020).
59 Id. at 1117.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Miami I, 137 S. Ct. at 1306.
63 Id. at 1306 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
64 Miami I, 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1,
10 (2010)).
65 Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390
(2014)).
66 Id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
7
Doughman: Wells Fargo v. City of Oakland
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2021
18 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
1. The Nature of the Statutory Cause of Action
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the FHA’s text and legislative history to
determine the intent of Congress in its enactment, and whether the inju-
ries to a city were likely to be considered sufficiently close to a bank’s
unlawful practices to establish proximate cause.67 The FHA text reveals
a broad inclusion intent.68 The law’s broad purpose is to “provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States.”69
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the FHA is “widely considered one
of the most capacious civil rights statutes, in large part due to its broad
language.”70 The FHA prohibits any form of discrimination in the sale,
rental, construction, improvement, maintenance, advertisement, terms,
conditions, notices, representations, or services of any form of real es-
tate.71 Indeed, senator Mondale said that continued housing discrimina-
tion would “lead to the destruction of urban centers by loss of jobs and
businesses to the suburbs, a declining tax base, and the ruin brought on
by absentee ownership of property.”72 The Ninth Circuit found this “far-
reaching language” to be evidence of a broad and inclusive interpretation
regarding Congress’s intent to eliminate discrimination in real estate.73
The legislative history is similarly sweeping. The Ninth Circuit ob-
served the Supreme Court’s prior reliance on Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company as an indication of the FHA’s desired breadth.74
Trafficante held that tenants in an apartment building who were not dis-
criminated against could still sue their landlord under the FHA for de-
priving them of diversity because the landlord discriminated against
minority prospective tenants.75 Trafficante indicated that while discrimi-
natory practices directly impact minority groups, those who are “not the
direct objects of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair housing,
as they too suffered.”76  The “whole community” is the victim of dis-
criminatory practices under the FHA.77 The court quoted Trafficante,
agreeing that the FHA allows claims from parties “act[ing] not only on
67 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1122.
68 Id. at 1124.
69 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
70 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1124.
71 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
72 114 CONG. REC. 3421, 3422 (Feb. 20, 1968).
73 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1124.
74 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1124 (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
209, 2011-12 (1972)).
75 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209, 211-12.
76 Id. at 210.
77 Id. at 211.
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol51/iss1/4
2021] Case Summary 19
their own behalf but also as private attorneys general in vindicating a
policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.”78
The Ninth Circuit’s review of the congressional record suggested a
strong preference for broad interpretation of the FHA, including the im-
pact of discriminatory housing practices on cities.79 The court quoted
senator Brooke, one of the co-sponsors of the FHA, who called out cit-
ies’ roles in fighting the fallout from segregation as they “find them-
selves less and less able to cope with their problems.”80 Senator
Mondale, the principal author of the FHA, “specifically and repeatedly
referenced cities’ ‘declining tax base’ as one of the large-scale injuries
that the FHA was designed to mitigate.”81 The Ninth Circuit thus found
Congress’s intended interpretation of the FHA to be “broad and inclusive
enough to encompass less direct, aggregate, and city-wide injuries.”82
2. Administrative Feasibility
The court cites Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion for the administrative feasibility prong, and acknowledges that this
prong is critical to determining if an alleged harm holds “some direct
relation” between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.83
In Holmes, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) alleged
that Holmes had conspired in a fraudulent stock manipulation scheme
that disabled SIPC’s ability to meet obligations to its customers.84 The
Court held that proximate cause was required, insisting on a direct rela-
tionship between conduct alleged and harm asserted.85
The Ninth Circuit recognized three factors laid out by the Holmes
Court: (1) whether the violation caused a plaintiff’s injuries, as opposed
to other independent factors; (2) whether it is possible to clearly identify
each plaintiff’s injuries to avoid multiple recoveries; and (3) “whether
78 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 209, 211-12 (1972)). Per Cal. Civ. Pro. § 1021.5, private attorneys general who successfully
defend an important right affecting the public interest will be awarded attorneys’ fees.
79 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1127 (quoting N. Haven Bd. Of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
526-527 (1982) (explaining that “remarks. . .of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted[ ] are
an authoritative guide to the statute’s construction”) (also quoting Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) (“As a statement of one of the legislation’s sponsors, this
explanation deserves to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute”).
80 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1124 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 2988 (Feb. 20, 1968)).
81 Id. at 1126 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (Feb. 20, 1968)).
82 Id. at 1124.
83 Id. at 1128 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r. Prot. Corp. 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
84 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
85 Id. at 268.
9
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allowing recovery for the indirect injury is unjustified by the general in-
terest in deterring injurious conduct.”86
First, the court held that Oakland plausibly alleged that its regression
analyses are capable of illustrating exactly which injuries are attributable
to Wells Fargo’s conduct.87 The court held these analyses were sufficient
to “calculate exactly which lost property-tax revenues are attributable to
Wells Fargo’s wrongdoing.”88 The court was satisfied that the analyses
would be “sophisticated, reliable, and scientifically rigorous” enough to
allow a case to proceed.89
Second, there would be no duplication of recoveries because Oak-
land and individual borrowers are seeking different claims.90 Oakland
alone can pursue recovery for city-wide injuries, while only the individ-
ual borrowers can seek redress for their actual injuries.91 The city is the
only viable party that can claim injury due to reduced property-tax rates
or increased municipal expenses.92
Thirdly, the court found that Wells Fargo’s alleged practices harm
“different parties in different ways.”93 The injury claimed by Oakland is
entirely different than that of a person suing for his or her individual
injuries and thus the parties would not be competing for the same recov-
ery.94 The court held that all three Holmes factors were satisfied and that
it would be administratively feasible for the district court to administer
Oakland’s injuries.95
B. THE APPLICATION OF THE PROXIMATE CAUSE STANDARD TO
OAKLAND’S CLAIMS
The Ninth Circuit held that Oakland’s claim for reduced property-
tax revenues as stated in the complaint satisfied the FHA’s proximate
cause requirement, but its claim for increased municipal expenses did
not.96 While the injury is not directly related, the court held that it was
closely related to the FHA-prohibited conduct.97
86 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1123 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
87 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1128.
88 Id. at 1128.
89 Id. at 1128-29.









Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol51/iss1/4
2021] Case Summary 21
Wells Fargo incorrectly claimed that a plaintiff must always allege
an injury that is the “immediate result” of a violation.98 In Lexmark, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that while it is the “general tendency”
to not go beyond the first step, if an “intervening link of injury” is found,
then a party may be granted an opportunity to prove proximate cause.99
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that if the Supreme Court
meant for the “first step” analysis to preclude all intervening steps in
proximate cause analyses, it would not have deferred to the lower
courts.100
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the FHA protects indi-
rectly injured parties.101 The Court’s analysis of Lexmark allows for a
wider inclusion of proximate cause, holding that if intervening steps did
not result in discontinuity, they might not break the causal chain.102 The
court held that these cases established proximate-cause principles based
on continuity that directly apply here.103 The court held that if Oakland’s
regression analyses successfully show that its injury was sufficiently iso-
lated from the injuries of the individual borrowers, yet flows continu-
ously from Wells Fargo’s conduct, the same principles from the non-
FHA cases would apply.104
In Lexmark, an antitrust case, the Court relied on the Lanham Act
that “permitted ‘any person who believes that he or she is likely to be
damaged by a defendant’s false advertising’ to sue.”105 Static Control
alleged that the false advertising by a printer cartridge manufacturer led
to customers not using Static Control’s product, which resulted in a loss
of business.106 The Court held that the harm alleged was “sufficiently
close” to the prohibited conduct such that Static Control could plead its
98 Id.
99 Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 140 (2014).
100 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1131; see also Miami I, 137 S. Ct. at 1306.
101 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1131; see, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 100-09 (1979) (holding a municipality had standing to sue realtors for discrimination, de-
spite no direct discrimination against the municipality); Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 (holding that
tenants may sue landlord for discriminating against prospective tenants, despite not suffering dis-
crimination personally); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1982) (permitting
an organization for fair housing to sue for harm against itself and its members).
102 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1131-2 (citing Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Com-
ponents, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 121, 134 (2014) (holding that printer and cartridge company who misled
customers was still responsible to the indirectly impacted cartridge-refurbishing company); Bridge v.
Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653-58 (2008) (holding that auction bidders had stand-
ing to sue co-bidders who filed fraudulent paperwork which increased the co-bidders’ chance of
winning the auction).
103 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1132.
104 Id. at 1132-33.
105 Miami I, 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 134).
106 Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 122-23 (2014).
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case.107 As under Iqbal, the Court would allow parties to bring cases
based on plausible claims that their evidence would be found to prove
proximate cause.108
Wells Fargo attempted to distinguish Lexmark from its application
here because the number of individual borrowers in this case who can
seek damages on their own exceeds that in Lexmark.109 However, the
court noted that individual borrowers frequently lack the resources to
sue, and will also often be time-barred, as the consequences of predatory
lending ofttimes surface after the statute of limitations has run out.110
The court pointed out that individual borrowers who have not yet suf-
fered the consequences of predatory lending might not realize the coming
danger of foreclosure, something that a city is in a better position to
observe.111
The court held that Oakland’s alleged injury—its decrease in prop-
erty-tax revenues—was directly and continuously related to Wells
Fargo’s discriminatory lending practices.112 Conversely, the same cannot
be said of Oakland’s claim regarding increased municipal expenses.113
The court held that Oakland did not properly demonstrate which in-
creases in its municipal expenses were attributable to Wells Fargo’s al-
legedly predatory conduct.114
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION
As the Supreme Court instructed in Miami I,115 the Ninth Circuit
analyzed proximate cause in relation to this distinct case.116 The text and
legislative history of the FHA have established a clear preference for a
broad interpretation as to who qualifies to sue as an “aggrieved person,”
providing a wide berth for showing causal connection.117 Through this
decision, the Ninth Circuit attempts to widen that berth.118 By holding
that cities have standing to sue for injuries directly and continuously re-
107 Id. at 133.
108 “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported
by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009).
109 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1133.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1135.
113 Id. at 1136.
114 Id.
115 Miami I, 137 S. Ct. at 1306.
116 City of Oakland, 972 F.3d at 1122-36.
117 Id. at 1124.
118 See generally City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2020).
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lated to FHA violations, the Ninth Circuit has extended the opportunity
for relief to parties who would not otherwise have a cause of action. By
extending the proximate cause relationship past the “first step,” the court
held that cities—likely in a better position to sue than individual borrow-
ers—have the proper judicial means to thwart predatory lending.
CONCLUSION
While predatory practices by banks have been responsible for much
of the discrimination and segregation in American cities, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holding provides a way for cities to hold the banks accountable. As
banks are held liable for their predatory practices, they will likely change
their lending methods. When minorities are no longer unfairly targeted
through predatory lending, at least part of the Fair Housing Act will have
accomplished its goal, realizing some of the potential and vision of Dr.
Martin Luther King’s dream: “I have a dream that one day this nation
will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: ‘We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.’”119
119 Martin Luther King, “I Have a Dream” Address Delivered at the March on Washington
for Jobs and Freedom, STANFORD: THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN-
STITUTE (Aug. 28, 1963), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/i-have-dream-ad
dress-delivered-march-washington-jobs-and-freedom.
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